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Abstract
A notable feature of post–World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We
provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully
defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly institutionalized
polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments
whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are
incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments
need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build oversized armies,
beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the
military in the future. (JEL: H2, N10, N40, P16)
1. Introduction
One of the most striking facts of post–World War II international politics is the
unusually long average duration of civil wars.1 Some scholars (e.g., Hironaka
2008) argue that this is largely due to the proliferation of politically weak states
since World War II and the onset of decolonization. Although the link between
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1. Civil wars during the 19th and early 20th century were usually relatively short; the average length
of a civil war between 1900 and 1944 was 1.5 years. After World War II, the average duration of civil
wars has tripled to over 4 years. The number of ongoing civil wars has also increased dramatically
since 1945. For example, an average of about 20 civil wars per year were ongoing concurrently
in the 1990s, corresponding to a rate approximately ten times the historical average since the 19th
century. The surge in the number of ongoing civil wars has been mainly due to the increase in average
duration rather than in the rate of outbreak of new conflicts. See Hironaka (2008).
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politically weak states (which lack the Weberian monopoly of violence) and
persistence of civil wars is compelling, it raises another major question: Why has
the political weakness of many post–World War II states persisted?
We provide an explanation for why civil wars may persist in weakly insti-
tutionalized polities. Central to our explanation is the political moral hazard
problem generated by a strong military (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2010a).
In weakly institutionalized polities, the checks to prevent a strong military
from intervening in domestic politics are absent. This makes the building of a
strong army a double-edge sword for many civilian governments, even if such
an army is necessary for defeating rebels and establishing the monopoly of
violence.
We formalize these ideas using a simple dynamic game. The civilian govern-
ment is controlled by an elite, which derives rents from holding power. It faces
armed rebellion from an opposition group (e.g., a group of different ethnicity or
religion). The minimum scale of the army is insufficient for ending this armed
rebellion and establishing the monopoly of violence. The elite can instead choose
a larger size army, which will end the civil war, but this will also increase the
role of the military in domestic politics. The civilian government–military inter-
action is complicated by the fact that the elite cannot credibly commit to not
reforming and downsizing the military once the civil war is over. Consequently,
a stronger military, which is necessary for defeating the rebels, may also attempt
a coup. Thus the elite often face a choice between a persistent civil war versus
the risk of a coup. Our framework also points out another strategy for the elite:
To build an over-sized army as a commitment to not reforming the military after
the end of the civil war (since the over-sized army is strong enough to resist any
attempt to reform). This suggests that in weakly institutionalized polities both the
persistence of civil wars and the emergence of over-sized armies with excessive
influence on domestic politics are possible equilibrium outcomes.2
Our analysis shows that when the elite’s rents are relatively unaffected by its
lack of monopoly of violence—for example, because the civil war is in a remote
area or it does not interfere with their control of natural resources—then the elite
will be unwilling to build a strong army. In contrast, when the rebels pose a more
costly threat to their rents, the elite is more likely to build a strong army, either
risking the possibility of a coup after the end of the civil war or accepting excessive
concessions to an over-sized army.
2. An illustrative example of a regime unwilling to build a strong army despite ongoing civil wars,
most likely because of fear of increasing the power of the military in the future, is Zaire (Congo)
under Mobutu. An example of a regime building a strong army to fight communist rebels and then
facing a coup is the Philippines under Marcos. Examples of regimes building over-sized armies that
have received significant concessions but have not attempted coups are provided by Egypt, Iraq, and
Syria starting in the 1960s (e.g., Owen 2004). Interestingly, the Egyptian military attempted a coup
precisely when President Sadat tried to downsize it.
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Our framework also generates a novel substitutability between fiscal and
political capacity of the state. Although these capacities are generally thought
to be complements (e.g., Besley and Persson 2009), in our model higher fiscal
capacity raises the equilibrium cost of building strong armies (because it makes
military dictatorships both more likely and more costly to the elite) and via this
channel, it contributes to the persistence of civil wars.
Our work is related to several different literatures in comparative politics. The
large literature on the causes of civil wars is surveyed in Blattman and Miguel
(2010). Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Herbst (2004) emphasize the role of weak
states in the emergence of civil wars, and Fearon (2007), Powell (2004), and
Yared (2009) analyze the duration of civil wars. Our paper is also related to the
small economics literature on weakly institutionalized polities, the problems of
weak states, and the analysis of state formation, including Acemoglu, Robinson,
and Verdier (2004), Acemoglu (2005), Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010b),
and Besley and Persson (2009), and to the political economy literature on regime
transitions (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Our analysis of the political
moral hazard problem between the civilian government and the military builds on
Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010a). The closely related and complementary
work by Besley and Robinson (2010) also emphasizes the cost of concessions
that the civilian government must make to the military and analyzes the choice
between strong armies and “tin pot” militaries.
2. The Model
We consider a society consisting of four social groups: the elite, E, the citizens,
L, the rebels, , and the military, M . Each agent j at time t = 0 maxi-
mizes E0
∑∞
t=0 βt (cj,t + rj,t ), where E0 is the expectation at time t = 0,
β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, cj,t ≥ 0 denotes the consumption of the
final good (equal to disposable income), and rj,t ≥ 0 is a rent appropriated
by each individual whose group is in power at time t , representing non-monetary
payoffs from holding power or returns from natural resources or other income
sources.
The size of the elite is normalized to 1. The size of the citizens is equal to
n, while the size of the military, which will be determined endogenously, is xt
at time t . For simplicity, we assume that only the citizens are recruited into the
army, and that x ∈ {x, xm, xh}, where x < xm < xh < n. The minimum size of
the army, x, is necessary for maintaining law and order and national defence. An
army of a size larger than the minimum level x can be chosen to deal with the
rebels as explained further subsequently. For reasons that will become obvious
shortly, we refer to xh as an “over-sized army.” Each elite agent has productivity
a, and each citizen has a productivity A < a. Citizens recruited into the military
do not produce any income.
Acemoglu et al. Persistence of Civil Wars 667
There are three political states st ∈ {W,D,M};3 W is a civilian regime with
civil war (rebellion); D is a civilian regime (democracy) without rebellion; and
M is a military dictatorship. The civilian government, with or without rebellion,
is ruled by the elite (e.g., a captured democracy or an oligarchy). In a military
dictatorship, the military commander (or a group of officers) is in power. Because
our focus is on the persistence of civil wars, we assume that the initial political
state is s0 = W ; that is, a civilian regime under a rebellion. If the rebellion is
defeated, there will be a transition to s = D, but the military can attempt a coup
against democracy and cause a transition to s = M . To simplify the analysis,
we assume that the military dictatorship is absorbing (i.e., once s = M , this will
apply in all future dates) and that a military coup is not possible starting from
s = W (so that possible transitions are W → D → M).
Both civil war and coups cause economic inefficiencies. Civil war disrupts
economic transactions and reduces all incomes by a factor δ ∈ [0, 1], so that
the income of each elite becomes (1 − δ)a and that of each citizen is (1 − δ)A.
Similarly, the military is not equipped to run the economy, and thus under a
military dictatorship, all incomes are reduced by a factor φ ∈ [0, 1].
The government collects revenues with proportional taxation τt ∈ [0, 1], and
these revenues are used to pay the salaries of soldiers. We model tax distortions in
a simple way, assuming that there are no costs of taxation until some rate τˆ > 0,
and after τ = τˆ , taxation is prohibitively costly (this makes τˆ the peak of the
Laffer curve). The government budget constraint, which must be satisfied at each
period, thus takes the form
w(xt | st )xt ≤ τ(xt | st )(at + (n − xt )At ), (1)
where w(xt | st ) and τ(xt | st ) denote the military wage and the tax rate with an
army of size xt in the political state st .
We next describe transitions in greater detail. As noted previously, we start in
s0 = W . There is a transition to s = D when the rebellion (civil war) is defeated,
and for simplicity, there is no further possibility of another rebellion. The prob-
ability that the rebellion will be defeated is a function of the strength of the state
(the size of the army). In particular, we assume that the civil war ends with prob-
ability p(x) ∈ [0, 1] in each period, where p(x) = p < p(xm) = p(xh) = 1.
This implies that when xt = x, there is a “high likelihood,” probability 1 − p,
that the civil war will persist because of the weakness of the state. In contrast, a
moderate or an over-sized army is sufficient to end the civil war immediately. In
addition, however, strong armies, x ∈ {xm, xh}, can undertake a coup against the
civilian government once the civil war is defeated. This makes them a double-
edge sword for the incumbent civilian government, for they defeat the rebels,
3. Payoff-relevant states will be given by elements of {W,D,M} × {x, xm, xh}.
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but may attempt a coup after the end of the conflict. The difference between the
intermediate-sized strong army, xm, and the over-sized strong army, xh, is that the
former can be downsized by the civilian government, and the probability that a
civilian government can do this within any given period is equal to λ ∈ [0, 1]. In
contrast, an over-sized army, x = xh, is strong enough to withstand any attempt to
reform and can thus never be reformed and downsized by a civilian government.
ϕt ∈ {0, 1} denotes the state of the world at time t where an intermediate-sized
army can (ϕt = 0) or cannot (ϕt = 1) be reformed. The initial size of the military,
x0, is decided by the civilian government at the beginning of time t = 0.
We also assume that each soldier has to put effort, which costs h > 0, in
fighting the rebels. If he does not do so, he is caught with probability q ∈ (0, 1),
and is punished by losing his wage for one period. This imperfect monitoring
technology will lead to “efficiency wages” for soldiers during times of civil war.
We represent the economy described so far as a dynamic game between the
soldiers and the elite.4 More formally, the timing of events starting in st = W or
D is as follows:
1. The civilian government chooses the size xt of the army, sets taxes τt and
military wages wt subject to the budget constraint (1) and the constraint that
xt = xt−1 whenever xt−1 = xh or whenever ϕt = 1 (i.e., the state of the
world at time t is such that the army cannot be reformed). Then:
2. If st = W , then rebels are defeated with probability p(xt ) and the civil war
ends permanently, inducing a transition to st+1 = D. Otherwise, st+1 = W ,
and the same sequence of events is repeated. If, instead, st = D, then: When
xt−1 = xm and the state of the world is such that the military can be reformed
(ϕt = 0), the civilian government decides whether or not to reform it (if there
is no reform, then xt = xm). When xt = xm or xt = xh, the military decides
whether to attempt a coup against the civilian government. A coup succeeds
with probability 1, inducing a transition to st = M .
Finally, in state st = M , which is absorbing, the military government chooses
taxes and military wages subject to the government budget constraint (1).
3. Characterization of Equilibria
We next characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of this dynamic
political game. We start in the political state s = W . Because fighting against
the rebels requires an effort cost h for each soldier and shirking is detected only
4. The rebels and the citizens do not play an active role because of our simplifying assumptions, and
there is no conflict within groups, so that we can suppose that decisions are taken by a representative
agent from each group (e.g., the commander of the army and a representative elite agent in a civilian
government).
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with probability q, the incentive compatible equilibrium military wage during the
civil war needs to be at least h/q (see Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2010b).
We assume that this wage also satisfies the participation constraint ensuring that
citizens are weakly better off as soldiers than as producers (for example, h/q ≥
(1 − τ¯)A, with τ¯ defined in equation (2), would be sufficient for this). Given
the income disruptions due to civil war, the tax rate that satisfies the government
budget constraint (1) is
τ¯i = xi
(1 − δ)(a + (n − xi)A)
h
q
for i ∈ {,m, h}, (2)
provided that this tax rate is less than the maximum feasible rate, τˆ .
Next consider the political state s = D. If x = x, then coups are not feasible
and effort is no longer necessary, thus military wages will be determined by the
participation constraint, which makes a soldier indifferent between working as
a civilian and working as a soldier—that is, w = (1 − τ)A, where τ is the
equilibrium tax rate in this case. Consequently, the value of a soldier and the
value of a civilian under democracy and x = x are
V M(D, x) = V L(D, x) = (1 − τ)A1 − β , (3)
where the tax rate τ balancing the government budget (1) is τ = xA/(a+nA).
When x ∈ {xm, xh}, the army may attempt a coup against the democratic
government in the state st = D, that is, after the rebels have been defeated.
Consequently, in these cases the elite need to take into account the strategy of the
military to set fiscal policy. In particular, as in Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni
(2010a), there will be a no coup constraint of the form,
V M(D, xi | coup) ≤ V M(D, xi | no coup) for i ∈ {m,h}, (4)
which the elite must satisfy if they wish to prevent coups; V M(D, xi | coup)
and V M(D, xi | no coup) denote the values of soldiers with an army size of xi
when they undertake a coup and when they choose not to do so. To derive the
implications of the no coup constraint, first consider a military regime, and let
R denote the rents that soldiers receive in such a regime. Because this regime is
absorbing and there are no costs of taxation until τˆ , soldiers will set τ = τˆ and
redistribute the proceeds as wages to themselves, so that
V M(M, xi) = R + τˆ (1 − φ)(a + (n − xi)A)/xi1 − β for i ∈ {m,h}, (5)
which takes into account that incomes are reduced by a fraction φ, because the
military is running the economy, and only n− xi citizens are working in produc-
tion. The proceeds from taxation are distributed equally among the soldiers, thus
the division by xi in the denominator.
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Consider next the case where x = xh (with s = D). If the elite do not prevent
coups, the value to the military is V M(D, xh | coup) = V M(M, xh) as given by
equation (5) for i = h. Alternatively, the elite could pay an “efficiency wage”
to the soldiers, wPh , to make it worth for them not to attempt coups—namely, to
satisfy the no coup constraint (4). When x = xh, the expression for the efficiency
wage is straightforward to derive, because there is no possibility of reforming
the military. Therefore, the value to the military when the elite pay such a wage
is V M(D, xh | no coup) = wPh + βV M(D, xh | coup), where wPh is the level of
the efficiency wage that makes equation (4) hold as equality, and this expression
takes into account that in the next period the military must receive the value that
it can get with a coup (either by undertaking a coup, or because the elite will pay
them the necessary efficiency wage). This implies that the efficiency wage will
be wPh = τˆ (1 − φ)(a + (n − xh)A)/xh + R, and the tax rate that satisfies the
government budget constraint in this case is
τPh = τˆ (1 − φ) +
xhR
a + (n − xh)A. (6)
However, it may not be feasible for the civilian government to pay such high
wages to soldiers because in the government budget constraint (1) we need to
have τ ≤ τˆ . Hence, coup prevention with an army of size xh is feasible only if
wPh xh ≤ τˆ (a + (n − xh)A). This implies that coups starting with x = xh can be
prevented provided that
φ ≥ xhR
τˆ (a + (n − xh)A) ≡ φ
∗
h. (7)
Let us next consider the case where x = xm (again with s = D). If the elite
prevent coups by paying an efficiency wage wPm , then the value to each soldier is5
V M(D, xm | no coup) = wPm + β[λV L(D, x) + (1 − λ)V M(D, xm | coup)],
which now takes into account that with probability λ there will be an opportunity
to reform and downsize the military, and the civilian government will use this
opportunity, and thereafter, soldiers will receive the value V L(D, x) as given by
equation (3). If there is no opportunity to reform, then the soldiers will receive
the value from a coup (either because they will undertake a coup or because the
no coup constraint (4) will be satisfied with equality). Using equations (3) and
(4), we can compute
V M(D, xm | no coup) =
wPm + β1−β λ(1 − τ)A
1 − β(1 − λ) .
5. This is the value of soldiers after the realization of the state of nature that the military cannot be
reformed.
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The value from a coup is given by equation (5). Repeating the same analysis as
previously, we find that with an army of size x = xm, it will be feasible to satisfy
the no coup constraint (4) only when
φ ≥ βλ
1 − β(1 − λ)
[
1 − (1 − τ)xmA
τˆ (a + (n − xm)A)
]
+ xmR
τˆ (a + (n − xm)A) ≡ φ
∗
m.
(8)
To save space, in the remainder, we impose the following assumption, which
allows us to focus on the more novel and economically interesting cases.
Assumption 1.
(1) Rm < R ≤ R¯h, where R¯h ≡ τˆ (a + (n − xh)A)/xh and Rm ≡ βA(1 −
xA/(a + nA)) + (1 − β)τˆ (a + (n − xm)A)/xm.
(2) φ ∈ [φ∗h, 1] and λ ∈ (λ∗, 1].
(3) β > β∗, where β∗ < 1 is implicitly defined by the following equation:
β∗A(1 − xA/(a + nA)) + (1 − β∗)τˆ (a + (n − xm)A)/xm
= τˆ (a + (n − xh)A)/xh.
The first part of Assumption 1 states that military rents in a military dictator-
ship are intermediate, so that military dictatorships are not desirable when soldiers
know that they will have sufficient influence in the civilian regime, that is, they
will receive efficiency wages without any risk of downsizing, but are worthwhile
when they do not receive efficiency wages. More specifically, R ≤ R¯h ensures
that φ∗h ≤ 1 so that for values of φ ∈ [φ∗h, 1] it will be feasible to satisfy equation
(4) and to prevent coups with an over-sized army (x = xh). In contrast, Rm < R
ensures that preventing coups with an intermediate-sized army (x = xm) is not
feasible when the probability of potential reform, λ, is sufficiently high (i.e.,
φ∗m > 1 as λ approaches to 1). In particular, let λ∗ be defined as the value of λ
such that φ∗m = 1. Then this assumption implies that when λ ∈ (λ∗, 1], equation
(8) can never be satisfied and coups cannot be prevented with an intermediate-
sized army. The second part of the assumption then imposes that φ ∈ [φ∗h, 1]
so that prevention of coups with an over-sized military is indeed feasible, and
λ ∈ (λ∗, 1] so that coup prevention with an intermediate-sized military is never
feasible. Finally, the third part of the assumption ensures that Rm < R¯h, so that
the first part of the assumption is meaningful.
Note that the expected value to the elite when there is a civil war and x = x
is:
V E(W, x) = (1 − τ¯)(1 − δ)a + r¯ + β[pV E(D, x) + (1 − p)V E(W, x)],
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where τ¯ is given by equation (2) and r¯ is the elite’s rent when they are in power
but there is an ongoing civil war. This expression incorporates the fact that the
rebels are defeated with probability p = p(x) in each period, and subsequently
the continuation value to the elite is V E(D, x) = ((1−τ)a+r)/(1−β), where
r is their rent from power without a civil war (since an army of size x cannot
attempt a coup, s = D with x = x is an absorbing state). Therefore:
V E(W, x) = (1 − β)((1 − τ¯)(1 − δ)a + r¯) + βp((1 − τ)a + r)
(1 − β)(1 − β(1 − p)) . (9)
Given Assumption 1, when the elite choose an army of size x = xm, then
coups cannot be prevented, and thus their value can be written as
V E(W, xm) = (1 − τ¯m)(1 − δ)a + r¯
+ β
[
λ((1 − τ)a + r)
1 − β +
(1 − λ)(1 − τˆ )(1 − φ)a
1 − β
]
, (10)
where τ¯m is given by equation (2). This expression takes into account that rebels
are defeated in one period and, in the following period, the army is reformed with
probability λ, while reforms are not possible with the complementary probability
and the military undertakes a coup.
Finally, if the elite choose x = xh, their value depends on whether coups will
be prevented in the subgame starting after the defeat of the rebels. Assumption
1 implies that prevention is feasible and optimal. Hence, the value to the elite in
this case is
V E(W, xh) = (1 − τ¯h)(1 − δ)a + r¯ + β
(
1 − τPh
)
a + r
1 − β . (11)
In light of this discussion, the potential strategies for the elite are: (1) form
an over-sized military (xh), defeat the rebels, and prevent coups, thus remaining
in power but with a very influential military; (2) form an intermediate army (xm),
defeat the rebels, but face the risk of military takeover; (3) choose a small army
(x), and thus allow for persistent civil war.
To compare these three options, note that V E(W, x) = V E(W, x | p)
defined in equation (9) is a strictly increasing function of the probability p that a
small army (x) will defeat the rebels (hence the explicit conditioning on p), and
V E(W, xh) and V E(W, xm) defined in equations (10) and (11) are independent
of p. This implies that there exists a threshold pˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that V E(W, xh) 
V E(W, x | p = pˆ) whenever p  pˆ, and a threshold p∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that
V E(W, xm)  V E(W, x | p = p∗) whenever p  p∗. It can be verified that
both thresholds are always smaller than 1, because the value to the elite when
x = x and p = 1 is always greater than their value when choosing xh and xm.
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However, these thresholds need not be positive. In particular, pˆ > 0 only when
V E(W, xh) > V
E(W, x | p = 0), that is, when
(1 − τ¯)(1 − δ)a < (1 − β)(1 − τ¯h)(1 − δ)a + β
(
1 − τPh
)
a + β(r − r¯). (12)
Otherwise V E(W, xh) < V E(W, x) for all p ∈ [0, 1], and in this case, a small
army (x) will always be preferred by the elite to an over-sized one (xh), and by
convention, in this case we set pˆ = 0. Similarly, p∗ > 0 when
(1 − τ¯)(1 − δ)a < (1 − β)(1 − τ¯m)(1 − δ)a + βλ(1 − τ)a
+ β(1 − λ)(1 − τˆ )(1 − φ)a + β(λr − r¯), (13)
and thus when this condition is not satisfied, the elite always prefer x to xm. In
what follows, the reader should bear in mind that both thresholds, pˆ and p∗, can
be zero.
Let us finally introduce the following condition:
(τ¯h − τ¯m)(1 − δ)a
≤ β
1 − β
[
(1 − λ)(r + φa) + (τ − τˆ (1 − φ))λa − xha
a + (n − xh)AR
]
.
(14)
It can be verified that when this condition is satisfied, V E(W, xh) > V E(W, xm),
and the elite prefer an over-sized army to an intermediate one.
We now provide a characterization of the MPE in this dynamic economy.6
Proposition 1. The political game herein has a unique MPE with the following
structure.
1. Suppose that equation (14) is satisfied and p ∈ [pˆ, 1] or that equation
(14) is not satisfied and p ∈ [p∗, 1]. Then the elite choose a small army, x = x,
and there is persistence of civil war. After (or if) the civil war ends, the civilian
government (the elite) remains in power.
2. Suppose that (14) does not hold and p ∈ [0, p∗), then the elite choose an
intermediate-sized army, x = xm, and the civil war ends immediately, but there
is possibility of a military coup and the formation of a military dictatorship.
3. Suppose that condition (14) is satisfied and p ∈ [0, pˆ), then the elite
choose an over-sized army, x = xh, the civil war ends immediately, and civil-
ian government remains in power, but with high wages and concessions for the
military.
6. The argument in the text gives the main idea of the proof of this proposition. A more detailed
characterization of the MPE and a formal proof are provided in the online Appendix.
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Corollary 1. pˆ is nondecreasing in r , δ, φ, and it is nonincreasing in
r¯ , τˆ , xh, R.
p∗ is nonincreasing in r¯ , τˆ , φ, xm, is independent of R, and is nondecreasing
in δ, and also in r if λ is high enough and nonincreasing in r otherwise.
Proposition 1 is the main result of the paper. It shows that the elite will choose
a small army (see point 1), and will not establish a monopoly of violence over
its territory, at least for a while, when p > pˆ or when p > p∗—that is, when a
small army is not too ineffective at fighting the rebels. Note, however, that both
thresholds pˆ and p∗ can be very small or equal to zero, so when a small army is
maintained, the civil war can persist for a very long time (in the limit forever as
p → 0, if both thresholds are zero). Corollary 1 shows that such an outcome is
more likely when r is low relative to r¯ , that is, when the elite receive significant
rents even when the civil war is ongoing (for example because the civil war is in
peripheral areas and does not interfere with the rents that the elite receive from
corruption or natural resources). Small armies and persistent civil wars are also
more likely when δ is low relative to φ, making the income loss (of the elite and
of the citizens) relatively small under civil war, and high under military regimes.
Finally, a high τˆ also makes this configuration more likely via two channels: First,
it makes a military dictatorship more costly to the elite (when this happens along
the equilibrium path); second, it makes a military dictatorship more attractive
for soldiers, thus making it more expensive for the elite to satisfy the no coup
constraint (when they prefer to do so). For reasons related to the second channel,
a high level of R (high rents for the military from controlling the government)
also makes the elite more likely to choose a small army and a weak state. In all
cases, the reason why the elite prefer a small army is that they are afraid of the
influence of and a potential coup by a strong army following the end of the civil
war.
When the elite decide to fight the rebels more vigorously to end the civil
war, they can do so using one of two different strategies. In the first one, they
build an intermediate-sized army, but because of their inability to commit to
not downsizing the army after the civil war ends, they cannot satisfy the no coup
constraint, and there is a positive probability of a coup along the equilibrium path.
In the second one, they build an over-sized army as a commitment to not reforming
the military in the future. This amounts to making permanent concessions (high
wages and other policy concessions) to the military as the price that the elite have
to pay for fighting the rebels and establishing some sort of monopoly of violence.
Note, however, that in this case this monopoly of violence is mostly in the hands
of the military not in the hands of the civilian government.
An interesting implication of the model, again highlighted by Corollary 1, is a
novel substitutability between fiscal and political capacity of the state. When τˆ is
high, the fiscal capacity of the state is high. This is generally thought to increase
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the political capacity of the state (e.g., Besley and Persson 2009). However, a
higher fiscal capacity also puts more economic power in the hands of the military
if they decide to attempt a coup. Through this channel, it discourages the civil-
ian government from building a strong military and the monopoly of violence
necessary for political capacity.
Finally, it is also useful to observe that the entire analysis is predicated on
the possibility that the military, once sufficiently large, can take control of the
government. In this sense, the model represents the workings of politics in a
weakly-institutionalized polity, which does not place major constraints on the
exercise of military power.
4. Concluding Remarks
We presented a simple model where civil wars persist because of the endogenous
weakness of the state. The civilian government, assumed to be under the control
of an elite, may prefer to forgo the establishment of the monopoly of violence over
its territory, allowing an ongoing civil war, because, given the weak institutions,
the elite are afraid of building a strong military. This fear is particularly relevant
when the civilian government is unable to commit to not reforming the military
after the civil war is over, and this commitment problem makes a military coup
more likely. One, potentially paradoxical, response of the civilian government,
when it needs to prevent the continuation of the civil war, is to build an over-sized
army as a commitment to not reforming the military after the threat of the civil
war is gone.
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